NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN
OWNED PROPERTY AND THE ACT OF
STATE DOCTRINE-TWO SPEECHES
HE recent nationalization of an estimated one billion dollars in
American owned property in Cuba has given rise to a myriad of
cases in the state and federal courts of this country. At the behest of
the American Foreign Law Association, and at their January 1963
meeting in New York City, Professors Baade and Domke discussed
these cases and particularly the controversial Act of State doctrine.
The remarks of these outstanding experts on the law of nationalization of property are printed here without revision, except for documentation.
T

THE PRESENT AMERICAN ATTITUDE
TOWARDS NATIONALIZATION OF
FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY
MARTIN DOMKE*

Americans currently talk or write about foreign nationalization problems, they are primarily concerned with the Cuban
situation where, for all practical purposes, only American interests
are involved. This was not the case with other foreign nationalizations of the recent past, such as the Iranian oil expropriation in 1952,
the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and the
Indonesian expropriation of Dutch property in 1958. Other expropriations of American interests occurred in some Latin American
countries and are in the making in Asia and Africa. Refined techniques are developing in the field of expropriation abroad. There
are many forms of creeping nationalization, discriminatory administration and violation of contractual rights of foreign parties. This
WHEN
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is especially true with regard to American stockholder interests in
foreign corporations: dissolution of the corporation, appropriation
merely of its own assets, and sometimes the confiscation of shares.
All these issues create difficult questions of application of foreign
corporation law with which American courts are faced.
An example of this question is the recent doubt of New York
courts on whether the Cuban nationalization of American property
rights constitutes nationalization at all within the meaning of section
977(b) of the Civil Practice Act. New York law provides for the
appointment of a receiver for the administration of assets of foreign
corporations which are dissolved, liquidated, nationalized, or have
ceased to do business. Now, the Cuban Law No. 851, of August 6,
1960, provides for the nationalization of Cuban corporations in
which Americans were the controlling stockholders. In Schwartz v.
Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaquey de Cuba,' Judge Baker
of the New York Supreme Court vacated a receivership on the
ground that the law only nationalized the assets of the Cuban
corporation and left the juridic personality of the company in existence, entitled to later compensation, and thus also to be able to do
business abroad. In another decision, on November 15, 1962,2 the
Appellate Division allowed the Cuban government to intervene in
an action of the New York stockholders under section 977(b) of the
Civil Practice Act, leaving it doubtful "if indeed they [the powers
conferred upon the intervenorby the Cuban decree] are found to be
confiscatory." 3
That the American attitude towards foreign nationalizations has
become somewhat confused can be shown by reading the notes on
the decision of March 31, 1961, of District Judge Dimock in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.4 Briefly, the Sabbatino case concerns a situation where a New York broker bought sugar from a
Cuban corporation of which more than 90 per cent was controlled by
American stockholders. The sugar was loaded on a ship in a Cuban
harbor when the Cuban nationalization law was issued on August
1 148 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1962, p. 13, col. 6; 149 Ibid., Mar. 14, 1963, p. 17, col.
2

7.

Mann v. Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba SA., 17 App. Div. 2d 193, 234 N.Y.S.2d
1001 (1962).
8234 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
'193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). No less than 19 notes have treated this case,
the most recent ones are 75 HAv. L. RF-v. 1607 (1962) and 62 COLUm. L. Ry. 1278

(1962).
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6, 1960. The sugar was undoubtedly within the territorial limits of
Cuba at the time of the nationalization. In order to get the cargo,
the New York brokerage firm made similar contracts with an agency
of the Cuban government, Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba.
The seller assigned the claim to the Banco Nacional de Cuba, which
asked for the sale proceeds in the New York action. Meanwhile,
on August 16, 1960, a receiver had been appointed in the person of
Mr. Sabbatino, who deposited the money with the New York Trust

Company under the supervision of the court.5
Both the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 6
dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's claim of title
depended on the validity of the Cuban nationalization law and that
this Cuban law would not be recognized and enforced in this country because it violated international law.
The international law of foreign nationalization has unfortunately been cast into some confusion. Court decisions of various
countries, not only those of the United States, fail to contribute
decisively to a clarification of the important issues involved. This
kind of confusion or uncertainty becomes evident in the recent
resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on sovereign immunity
over natural resources. 7 Its article 4 reads as follows:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests,
both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law. In any case, where the question of compensation
gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute
should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.
The wording was adopted after twenty-six amendments had been
considered, among them one sponsored by the United States, to
substitute for "appropriate compensation" the words "prompt, adequate and effective." It remains undetermined which law prevails
r Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 12 App. Div. 2d
506, 207 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1960).
0307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3259 (Feb. 18, 1962).
7 U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/1803 (XVIi) (Dec. 19, 1962).
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on the question of compensation-the domestic law of the expropriating country, or international law.
Another interesting expression of the American attitude is the
recent legislative enactment of Section 630(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.8 There, the President is required in a mandatory
way to suspend any aid to a country which, in an expropriation after
January 1, 1962, has not taken "appropriate steps, which may
include arbitration, to discharge its obligations under international
law toward such [American] citizen or entity, including equitable
and speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign
exchange, as required by international law."9 This threat of discontinuing foreign aid may play a decisive role in negotiations with
Brazil and Ceylon on compensation for expropriated American interests.9 a Unfortunately this aspect of expropriation without compensation was not determined by Circuit Judge Waterman in the
Sabbatino case: "Whether a government's failure, in and of itself,
to pay adequate compensation for the property it takes is a breach
of international responsibility, we decline at this time to attempt a
resolution of that difficult question."' 0 Suffice it to note here what
the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, recently said at a meeting of the
National Business Advisory Council: "Any sovereign national has
the right to expropriate property, whether owned by foreigners or
nationals. In the United States we refer to this as the power of
eminent domain. However, the owner should receive adequate and
prompt compensation for his property.""
We now observe a curious interplay of the executive and judicial
authority to determine the effect of foreign nationalization on
American property rights. One should not lose sight of the basic
fact that this is less a political question than one of monetary interest to the American taxpayer whose property rights in foreign
investments abroad have to be safeguarded. In this field there is
great confusion regarding two concepts of international law: immunity and the Act of State doctrine. Briefly, immunity concerns
the exemption of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of other coun876

Stat. 260, 22 U.S.CA. § 2370 (e) (1962).
lbid.
9
&Meanwhile, the United States foreign assistance program was suspended in Ceylon

on Feb. 8, 1963. See 109 CONG. REc. 2019 (Feb. 11, 1963).
10 307 F.2d at 864.
1

" Press Release of the State Department No. 633, Oct. 19, 1962, p. 11.
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tries, immunity rationepersonae. The Act of State doctrine is based
on an immunity ratione materiae, namely that the foreign judge
should not be allowed to review the acts of another sovereign which
were done within the latter's territory.
An example of the confusion is the case of Pons v. Republic of
Cuba.12 There, a former official of the Cuban government had in his
possession about $56,000 which he undoubtedly had to return to
the Cuban government. In zn action of the Cuban government, he
made a counterclaim for compensation for the value of his property
which was confiscated in Cuba. The courts dismissed this counterclaim, the Court of Appeals stating the rule "that a foreign sovereign's seizure of its own national's property in its own territory can3
not be reviewed in our courts.'
An interesting incident in this case was the fact that the court
"invited the Department of Justice and the Department of State to
file briefs, if they should see fit, expressing their views on any issues
or question of interest to them in this case."'14 No briefs were filed.
It may be that our government felt that it did not have to give
any expression of its views on Cuban nationalizations, since a Cuban
national and not a American was involved. Generally, the relationship of a national to its own government is not a question of international law. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held, in the recent decision of Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Insurance Company,15 where Cuban exiles were allowed to institute a
law suit against a Louisiana insurance company: "It matters not
whether the thrust of those [Cuban] decrees be directed against
Cuban nationals or American citizens."' 6
Immunity is not involved if the government itself sues in the
courts of this country. This is the case in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,7 where the Cuban government claimed the proceeds
of the sugar sale through its bank. Immunity only plays a role where
the foreign government or its agency is the respondent in a law suit.
The courts in this country are generally inclined to accept a sug294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962).
at 926.
1t
Ibid.
12

18294 F.2d

"311 F.2d 429 (1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WF.FK 3284 (U.S. Mar. 5,
1963) (No. 792-93).
20 Id. at 436.
17 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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gestion by the State Department of immunity of the foreign government as conclusive and will dismiss the claim against the foreign
government for lack of jurisdiction.13
An exception to this acceptance of the State Department's suggestion can be found in the Czechoslovakian nationalization cases
which were decided by the New York Court of Appeals as recently as
November 1, 1962.1 There the court, in affirming the decisions
below, considered the suggestion of the State Department as outside
of the usual function when the suggestion of immunity thereby
tried to determine title to assets of a foreign nationalized bank.
As far as the immunity concept is recognized in Cuban matters,
the famous case of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba20 may be mentioned.
There, the merchant vessel Bahia de Nipe, owned by the Cuban
government, came to Norfolk where the captain and the crew sought
political refuge. One libelant, the United Fruit Company, claimed
that the cargo of sugar had been unlawfully confiscated by the
Cuban government. All courts unanimously agreed on the immunity of the Cuban government, after the State Department suggested a release of the ship and its cargo. 21
Confusion also exists in this field of sovereign immunity of the
Cuban government, since the United States has severed diplomatic
22
relations with it. In Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe,
the court held, without advice by the State Department, that the
Cuban government was not entitled to sovereign immunity until
the resumption of normal diplomatic relations.
In another Cuban case, 23 the question arose whether plaintiff, a
banking firm existing under Cuban law and an agent or instrumentality of the Cuban government, might sue for loss resulting
from the failure of the Liberian shipping company, owner of S. S.
28 Cf., the recent article by John Norton Moore, The Role of the State Department
in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FOIWHAM L. REv. 277 (1962).
29 Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 186 N.E.2d 676, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1962); Wolchok V. Statni Banka Ceskoslovenska, 12 N.Y.2d 784, 186 N.E.2d 678, 235

N.Y.S.2d 3 (1962).
20

197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
briefs filed before the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court in

21 The

petitions for stay of execution, are published in 1

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS

276. These petitions were ultimately unsuccessful. See also 50 CALIF. L. REV. 559
(1962).
199 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Texas 1961).
23 P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d
415 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3255 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963) (No. 403).
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Ruth Ann, to deliver a cargo of beans. The court remanded the
case to the district court, with instructions to ascertain from the
State Department "what is the status of the Republic of Cuba as a
state and its right to sue in our courts during the period of cessation
of diplomatic relations." 24
Uncertainty also exists in the field of sovereign immunity, especially whether transactions of the foreign government are of a commercial character so that the restricted concept of the so-called Tate
Letter 25 becomes applicable. A foreign government acting jure
gestionis (not jure imperii) should not be authorized to claim
immunity from American jurisdiction. Thus, in Harris & Co.
Advertising v. Republic of Cuba,26 where the respondent had not
obtained a suggestion for immunity from the State Department, the
court reversed, holding that the contract for the promotion of tourist
trade to Cuba was of a commercial character. This was followed in
Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba.27 In that case of a
breach of a contract for the sale of frozen shrimp by the Cuban
Department of Fisheries, the court said: "If Cuba is permitted to
collect dollars on its commercial activities it must respond in our
28
courts on its commercial contracts.
The confusion regarding the concepts of immunity and also of
the Act of State doctrine-the latter to be discussed instantly-led
Senator Ervin to introduce a bill to provide means of redress for
the unlawful seizure of American property by foreign governments.
The bill provides as follows:
If the matter in controversy in any such action involves, or arises out of,
an act of a foreign state in violation of general principles of international
law, or of a treaty to which the United States and the foreign state are
signatories, it shall be no bar to the maintenance of the action that it is
its consent, or that it involves
brought against a sovereign state, without
29
the validity of official acts of such state.
Mind the last words: "official acts of such state." This is the basic
issue in the forefront of judicial determination when American
interests are affected by foreign nationalizations. Here, the Act of
24 Id. at 418.

2 26 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 984 (1952).
*8127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
32 Misc. 2d 4, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1961).
28 Id. at 6, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
"S. 3795, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 5. 1902).
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State doctrine is challenged, namely whether the American judge
should be free to adjudicate the effect of foreign nationalizations
when the latter are in violation of international law. In other
words, are exceptions possible from the application of the Act of
State doctrine? This issue was raised in recent decisions regarding
the Indonesian nationalization of Dutch tobacco in Dutch and
German courts, granting such an exception (Court of Appeals,
Amsterdam), and denying it (Court of Appeals, Bremen). 0
In the United States, both Judge Dimock and Judge Waterman
in the Sabbatino case considered the Cuban nationalization of American property interests in violation of international law and therefore
held the Act of State doctrine not applicable.
It is generally accepted that this doctrine is not a rule of international law. Therefore, as the Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, Proposed Official Draft, said: "Refusal
to apply it [Act of State dotcrine] does not give the foreign state,
whose acts of state are either questioned or denied effect, a ground
for objection under international law." 8'
And in a Caveat to
section 43, it is said:
The Institute takes no position whether the afore rule stated in § 41
permits examination in the United States of the validity of an act of a
foreign state challenged as in conflict with it but calls attention to the
fact that in such situations there igno precedent expressly contrary to the
possibility that an act so challenged could be examined. 82
This viewpoint was shared by both Judge Dimock and Judge
Waterman in the Sabbatino case. Both judges did not feel inhibited
from excluding the application of the Act of State doctrine in a case
before them, where the Cuban nationalization measures against
American interests were considered as violating recognized principles and rules of international law.
Suffice it to note here that the many expressions of the Executive
on the abhorrent and confiscatory character of the Cuban Law No.
851 were considered as freeing the courts from any inhibition to
adjudicate the issue of validity and recognition of the Cuban meas-

30 Translations from the pertinent parts of these dedsions are to be found in Domke,
Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 313,.
315 (1960).
S1 RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 comment g
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"3Id. at § 43.

Vol. 1963:281]

NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 289

ures. In other words: A situation did prevail, similar to that in
the second Bernstein case. 33 There the Nazi government had forced
the transfer of title to two merchant ships of plaintiff, a Jewish national of Germany. The Act of State doctrine, excluding a review
of the acts of the foreign government, was not applied by the Court
after the State Department had notified its policy "to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." 3 4 The case
was ultimately settled.
Unfortunately, the Executive appears not to share the court's
determination in the Sabbatino case that the State Department in
various notes and communications on Cuban nationalization "has
expressed a lack of concern as to the outcome of the litigation."3 8
In the pending proceedings of the Sabbatino case, the Supreme Court
of the United States, by an order of November 20, 1962, invited the
Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. The
latter's Memorandum stated the premise of the Bernstein cases:
[A] court will not examine into the acts of a foreign state affecting
property within the latter's territory unless the Executive Branch states,
in some formal manner, that it has no objection to such examination....
We take no position at this time as to whether this is a permissible or
desirable limitation on the Act of State doctrine.38
This, indeed, is not a favorable omen for the protection of property
rights of Americans. Anyway, in the event that a writ of certiorari
is granted as urged by the Solicitor General, he "will undertake to
present a full statement of the position of the Executive Branch and
supporting argument upon the merits."37
In a case like Sabbatino, it is the foreign government itself as
claimant which seeks to reap the benefits of its nationalization measures with the aid of foreign courts. All the more, the courts should
not abdicate their function to determine the private rights of
American citizens, irrespective of the attitude the government has
"Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954).
"Id. at 376.
307 F.2d at 859.
"Memorandum for United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, p. 6 (U.S. Supreme Court, October Term 1962, No.
403); reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIAis 217 (1963).
87 Id. at 10; 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERALS at 221. Meanwhile, certiorari was
granted on February 18, 1963, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3255 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963) (No. 403).
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to take, the latter being guided by expediency which may be justified
under existing political circumstances. Courts should therefore not
be deprived of their essential function to adjudicate issues of private
property rights.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF CUBAN
EXPROPRIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
HANS W. BAADE*
INTRODUCTION

THE

PROBLEM which I propose to discuss is the legal effect of
Cuban expropriation measures in the United States. I shall start
with the basic assumption that under "normal" conflict of laws
rules prevailing in the various states of the United States, title to the
properties and contract rights covered by the Cuban expropriation
measures is determined by Cuban law. 1 I shall also assume that the
expropriation measures in question have legal validity in Cuba-a
point which is hardly open for discussion at this date2-and that
despite the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the United
States and Cuba, the present (Castro) government is the recognized
and therefore the lawful government of Cuba, at least in so far as
the United States is concerned.3
* A.B. 1949, Syracuse University; LL.B., LL.M. 1955, Duke University. Dr. iur.
1951, Privatdozent 1960, University of Kiel, Germany. Diploma, Academy of International Law, The Hague 1956. Associate Professor of Law, Duke University.
'Banco Naci6nal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1962); see
EHRENZWEIG, CoNFuCr OF LAWS 170-73, esp. 172 (1962).
2
For a comprehensive discussion of Cuba expropriation legislation, see Garrcau de
Loubresse, De quelques dliments de la ldgislation de la Rdpublique de Cuba en
mati~re d'intervention iconomique et de nationalisation,13 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE
DRorr CoMPARl 774 (1961). The development of Cuban constitutional law since the
Castro revolution is critically discussed in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA
AND THE RULE OF LAW 78-113 (1962).
8
In Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe, 199 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D.
Tex. 1961), it was held that the breaking of formal diplomatic relations between the
United States and Cuba "resulted in withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the
Republic of Cuba"; that until such relations were resumed, the defense of covereign,
immunity was not available to Cuba; and that until such resumption of diplomatic
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Since the Cuban expropriation legislation is "normally" applicable by virtue of conflict of laws rules prevailing in the United
States, legal recognition of the changes effected by such legislation
can only be excluded by exceptional rules restricting or supervening

the "normal" ones.

It has been contended by authors, and in-

creasingly held by eminent courts, that the "normal" conflict of laws

rules are indeed supervened by the appropriate rules of public international law. It has also been held by the Fifth Circuit,4 but seemingly not been argued by many writers, that the "normal" rules are

similarly supervened by the public policy of the forum., I shall deal
with each of these points in turn. But first, of course, we have to

dispose of a point which, to the extent that it is pertinent, makes all
considerations of international law and of public policy irrelevant.
I mean, of course, the Act of State doctrine.

I
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

As formulated by the Supreme Court, this doctrine means that
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." 5 If applicable
relations, "neither the Republic of Cuba nor anyone acting in its behalf had the power
to bring suit in this court to assert rights of possession...." In P & E Shipping Corp.
v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962), the First
Circuit directed the trial court to ascertain from the State Department, inter alia,
the status of the Cuban government in the United States courts during the period of
cessation of diplomatic relations. The State Department has of course consistently
maintained that the cessation of diplomatic relations with Cuba did not affect the
recognition of the government of that country. In response to an inquiry by counsel
for defendant in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Company, 311 F.2d
438 (5th Cir. 1962), Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department, stated in a letter dated April 15, 1961: "On January 5, 1961, the Government of
the United States severed diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of
Cuba. This action did not constitute a cessation of recognition of the Government
of Cuba. The United States has recognized without interruption, and continues to
recognize, as the Government of Cuba, the Government of which Fidel Castro is
Premier." Reprinted in Record, p. 49. The State Department has also informed
counsel for defendant in the P & E Shipping Corp. case that "In response to the inquiry
of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico this Department
advised the District Court that the United States continues to recognize as the Government of Cuba the Government of which Fidel Castro is Premier." Letter of Miss
Whiteman to Leonard B. Boudin, dated December 20, 1962.
'Rodrignez v. Pan American Life Insurance C., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962). But

see infra note 35.
5 Underhill v. Harnandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 302-03, 303-04 (1918).

For a comprehensive discussion, see Note, The
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here, it obviously prevents judicial inquiry into the validity of the
Cuban expropriation measures.
It has been asserted that the Act of State doctrine is subject to a
limitation-or better, a potential limitation-and to an exception.
The limitation, based on the decision of the Second Circuit in the
second Bernstein case, is that the Executive can, by a "supervening
expression of Executive policy," free the courts from the restraints
of the Act of State doctrine." The exception is based on a controversial reading of the Supreme Court's Act of State doctrine cases7
as well as on the decision of the Supreme Court of the Colony of
Aden in the Rose Mary case." It holds that the Act of State doctrine
is not applicable where the act in question is in violation of international law. This latter exception has been recognized by the District
Court in the Sabbatino case,9 but abandoned by the Second Circuit.
Thus, it presently seems to be without judicial sanction in the
United States.
The possible limitation of the Act of State doctrine by executive
declaration, on the other hand, is currently at the heart of the dispute. There seems to be some question whether Bernstein II is good
law-i.e., whether the Executive can limit the scope of the Act of
State doctrine at all. For whatever it may be worth, I regard this
point as settled in the affirmative.
The next question-the focal point of the Sabbatino case at the
present stage of the proceedings-is whether the Executive has in
fact and in the proper form manifested its will that ihe courts be
freed from the restraints of the Act of State doctrine. This depends
on the degree of clarity required, and on an appreciation of executive action or inaction in accordance therewith. The Second Circuit
has deemed it sufficient that "the State Department has expressed
Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and Public International Law, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (1962). For a more detailed discussion of the views developed
in the text, see Baade, The Expropriation of Foreign Property and the Decline of the
Act of State Doctrine, J. Bus. LAw, April, 1963.
0 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954).

Compare RESTATEMENT,

FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW OF TM UNITED STATES

§ 43, Caveat

and Reporter's Note 3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), with Metzger, The Act of State
Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 881 (1962).
sAnglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246,
248 (Supreme Court, Colony of Aden).
g Banco Nadonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 380-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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a lack of concern in the outcome of the litigation." The court
held that there has in fact been such an expression of lack of concern.10 The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that
the Executive Branch must state "in some formal manner, that it
has no objection" to the examination of the relevant foreign act of
state; and he challenges the Second Circuit's finding that there had
been such a statement as "erroneous."" Presumably, this issue will
be settled if and when the Supreme Court decides to review the
Sabbatino case;' 2 and I feel little temptation here to act as a prophet
at this time.
But let us assume that the Second Circuit's decision on the Act

of State aspects of the Sabbatino case is upheld. This will meanand has already meant in
Fifth Circuit-that courts
adjudicate the validity of
by what standards are they

several subsequent cases decided in the
in the United States are now free to
the Cuban expropriation decrees. But
to be guided in doing so?
II

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Let us start with international law, by all odds the less unruly
member of our team of horses, and let us assume that international
law still requires some-if not full-compensation for the nondiscriminatory nationalization of the property of aliens, and possibly
full compensation for individual and discriminatory expropriations. "' Let us further assume that Cuba was not under international law entitled to take the relevant measures as legitimate acts
of reprisal, and as of the time of adjudication, is not entitled to valid
20 Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1962).
11
Memorandum for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, pp. 6, 7 (U.S. Supreme Court, October Term, No. 403); also reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIAI.s 212, 216, 217 (1963).
12 Certiorari was granted in Sabbatino on February 18, 1963. 31 U.S.L. WEE 3259
(Feb. 18, 1963).
13 See the authorities on both sides of the controversy collected in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, at 862-64 (2d Cir. 1962). Note, incidentally, that
the present writer did not, in the article cited id. at 864, assert that adequate compensation is not required by international law. He merely stated that the question
was "quite doubtful" with respect to general expropriations, but then went on to
assume-without so deciding-that the obligation to pay compensation in such cases
still exists, at least as between non-socialist states. Baade, Indonesian Nationalization
Measures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 801, 803-04, 808 (1960).
For recent official United States declarations on this question, see infra note 25.
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setoffs or counterclaims. In other words, let us proceed from the
premise that the Cuban expropriation measures, so far as they
affected the property of aliens, had features which were and are
contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of
such irregularities?
The Second Circuit has held in the Sabbatinocase that one whose
property 'was expropriated in violation of international law may
14
attack in the United States the validity of the expropriator's title.
In so holding, the court expressly met-or, as I will of course contend,
sought to meet-my argument that the wrong under international
standards is not in the taking but in the failure to pay compensation
for the taking, that international tribunals have never granted
restitution of the property taken, and that the expropriator therefore has good title to the property seized, subject to a duty to pay
damages. 15
The court seems to accept these arguments at face value, much
to my delight and-at least so I hope-equally to the dismay of mine
enemies. 16 But it goes on to say that national courts also play a part
"4 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 868 (2d Cir. 1962).
15See Baade, supra note 13, at 808-50; Baade, The Validity of Foreign Confiscations:

An Addendum, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1962).
'OEspecially Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 611-15
(1961); Wortley, Indonesian Nationalization Measures-An Intervention, id. at 680;
Mann, Vdlkerrechtswidrige Enteignungen vor nationalen Gerichten, [1961] NEUE
JuMuasMcHn WOCHENSCH r 705, 708. Wortley specifically challenges my statement
that no international tribunal has ordered specific performance or restitution. He
asserts: "The practice of giving specific restitution which was established against
Portugal earlier this century in respect of ecclesiastical properties of foreigners is still
a normal remedy." Id. at 681. My reading of the Portuguese Religious Properties
cases is to the contrary; see Permanent Court of Arbitration, awards of September 2,
1920, France v. Portugal, I R.IA.A. 11-14; and Great Britain v. Portugal, id. at 14-16.
These cases arose out of the seizure by Portugal, in accordance with a decree of October
8, 1910, of certain properties held in the name of French and British nationals but
used by religious corporations. The latter had been dissolved by the decree, and their
assets had been declared forfeit to the state. The legality of the dissolution of the
religious corporations and of the confiscation of their assets was not an issue. France
and Great Britain claimed that the holding of title for the use of religious corporations
was lawful at the time of the acquisition of the properties by their nationals, and that
the seizure of the properties therefore constituted an interference with vested rights in
violation of international law. Both claimant states sought "la restitution ou la valeur"
of the properties; and both stated in identical language that they did not question either
"la Idgalit6 ou . .. la validit, au point de vue du droit interne portugais, des actes
du Gouvernement de ]a Rdpublique Portugaise." British Observations gdndrales of
February 21, 1914, at 6; French Observations g~ndrales of January 31, 1914, at 18, 18.
Portugal did not dispute the principle of international law on which the claims were
based, but contended that the "ownership" of the religious properties by foreign
nationals was a sham and a subterfuge to avoid the incidence of the Portuguese
mortmain laws. There were altogether 30 claimants (20 French, 10 British), and 28
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in the development of international law; that they are competent to
grant restitution; and that this remedy-whether it be a feature of
international or of domestic law-will often be the only deterrent
to violations of international law.17
It is difficult to quarrel with a decision which obligingly assents
to lay down new law. But I for one doubt whether this holding

in Sabbatino will be accepted throughout the world as a new rule of
judge-made customary interrqational law. For the court assumes,
without any discussion, that it is the individual and not his government who can invoke the protection of international law against
foreign confiscations. This, I submit, is quite wrong. Under international law, the United States was entitled to claim reparation
from Cuba, be it compensation or restitution. The individual concerned has, at least in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary,
no rights under international law. Consequently, "Mr. Sabbatino"
could claim neither compensation nor restitution from Cuba on
the basis of international law.' 8
In the Indonesian tobacco case' 9 which I discussed in the article
cited by the court, the Netherlands government had at least in a
formal note stated that it regarded the expropriations in question to
be "absolutely at variance with international law and therefore unproperties involved (19 held by French nationals, 8 by British nationals, and one held
jointly by both). Claims with respect to 5 properties (4 British, I French) were dismissed. The panel of the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that "Le Gouvernement
titre de propridtaire" 21 of the remaining
de la R1publique Portugaise conservera
properties, and awarded lump-sum indemities to the French and British governments.
I R.I.A.A. at 13-14, 16. The two exceptions concern a chapel and a girls' school held
by French claimants. The former had been seized but was not in use at the time of
the award, and the latter was still in operation. The Tribunal ordered the chapel,
which had been devised to two French nuns (Denise Alis and Marie Solomiac) who
under canon law could not hold property, to be "laisske" to them in order to be put at
the disposition of the Papal nuncio in Lisbon. With respect to the girls' school,
the Tribunal held that it was to be permitted to remain in operation but to revert
to Portugal in exchange for an indemnity when no longer used for its present purpose.
I R.IA.A. at 14. It seems rather hard to regard the Tribunal's disposition of the AlisSolomiac claim as a "precedent" for anything but the proposition that only in the
rarest of instances (here: one out of 23 successful claims) will an international tribunal
with power to do so actually order restitution instead of awarding pecuniary compensation.
17

307 F.2d at 868-69.

2'See the authorities collected in Baade, supra note 13, at 805 n. 28; Note, The
Act of State Doctrine-ItsRelation to Private and Public InternationalLaw, 62 COLUM.
L. RaV. 1278, 1303-05 (1962).
10 Oberlandesgericht Bremen, decision of August 21, 1959, 9 ARcmv DEs VbLKERPCHTs

318 (1961).
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lawful and invalid."2 Consequently, an identical assertion of a
private plaintiff in a German court, even if it came from an improper
party, did at least not prejudice the real party in interest. But in
the Cuban case, the United States government has never asserted
that the expropriations are invalid. It has not even unequivocally
stated that it will, contrary to all previous practice, seek restitution
instead of compensation. The State Department has called for the
22
dustomary filing of claims; 21 and in the Bahia de Nipe litigation,
23
the Executive has even stated point blank:
It may be assumed that the confiscation is unlawful under international law, i.e., so far as relations between the Governments of the United
States and Cuba are concerned. But that does not mean that Cuba, as
between itself and petitioner, does not have valid title to the expropriated
property so far as our courts are concerned. It seems rather hard to
believe that under these circumstances, a private plaintiff should be entitled to seek a remedy for a public wrong which is not sought by his
government.
Let me summarize my comments on the role of international
law in this connection. I am prepared to stick by my assertions
(1) that acts in violation of international law are not void under
the internal law of the actor state; (2) that international law does
not regulate the "property" side of territorial expropriations, but
merely imposes, in appropriate cases, an obligatio to offer monetary
Note of December 18, 1959, official English translation reprinted in 54 AM. J.
L. 484, 485 (1960).
Department of State, memorandum of March 1, 1961, reprinted in Kerley,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 165, 166-67 (1962). For a detailed discussion of the position of the United States
20

IN 21
L

in the Mexican expropriation controversies, see WooD, THE MAKING OF THE GOOD
NEIGHBOR Poucy 203-59 (1961). This study establishes that subsequent to the

adoption of the Good Neighbor policy and especially of its concomitant, non-intervention, the United States did not dispute the legal validity of expropriations of
American-owned properties by Latin American states but merely insisted, in appropriate cases, that compensation for such takings be fixed through bilateral diplomatic
negotiations. In the light of these carefully documented findings, the analysis of
earlier State Department practice by Wetter, Diplomatic Assistance to Private Investment, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 275 (1962), would seem to be only of historical interest.
32Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961), ajf'd, 295 F.2d 24
(4th Cir. 1961); see Note, 1962 DuxE LJ. 582.
23 Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Application for a stay of
United Fruit Sugar Company, September, 1961, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 302 (1962). The arguments advanced by the Executive appear to have
been accepted by the Chief Justice of the United States who, on September 14, 1961,
denied the application for a stay. See id. at 276, 277. These proceedings have not
been published elsewhere.
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compensation; and (3) that the standard remedy for "illegal" expropriations is monetary compensation, not restitution. 24 But even

if it should develop that-due to the initiative of the Second Circuit,
or otherwise-restitution becomes a standard international law
remedy for "illegal" expropriations, this will not alter the picture.
It still will be up to the government, not the private litigant, to
assert the remedy. The United States, at any rate, seems unlikely to
do so. For as spokesmen of the State Department have recently
declared on two separate occasions, the United States is now of the

opinion that compensation for the taking of American property
abroad must be "reasonably adequate and reasonably prompt."' 2 5

Since this clearly implies acquiescence in the practice of deferral of
payment, it seems hard to believe that after the delay thus indicated,
protest will be contended to unsettle changes of title effected in the

meantime.
III
PUBLIC POLICY

This, to coin a phrase, is not the end of the matter. Once it is
admitted that foreign expropriation legislation which is not protected by the Act of State doctrine can be refused recognition if
found to be contrary to the public policy of the forum, it still can
be contended that a foreign expropriation in violation of international law is ipso facto contrary to public policy. Where the
forum's own nationals are concerned, I find this argument quite
26
compelling.
" See Baade, supra note 13, at 830 and passim; Baade, supra note 16, with further
references on both sides of the controversies, id. at 504 n2. This position is further
supported by A. A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES To FOREIGN INVESrORS, 310-13
(1962); Stoll, Viilkerrechtliche Vorfragen bei der Anwendung auslandischen Rechts, 4
BEmucHTE DER DEUTISCHEN GEsE.LLscHArT rO VbucmwCHT 131, 141-42 (1961). With respect to point (8), see MENZEL, V6LKEmucirr 277, 286-88 (1962). I regretfully part
company with our staunchest ally over many years, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or Adoption of International Law Into Municipal Law, 12 INT'L & COMtP. L.Q.
88, 94 (1963).
"5Ball, American Business Abroad, 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 912, 914 (1962); Chayes,
The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress, 47 id. 192, 195 (1962): "The right to take
private property is implicit in sovereignty. Our own Constitution recognizes it. And
the United States has long conceded that other countries have the right to expropriate
property, including that of Americans, provided they offer just compensation, that is,
compensation that is reasonably adequate and reasonably prompt."
21 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, Reprisals and the Taking of Private Property, 9 NETrhRLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAw REvIEW 470, 476 (special issue 1962): "If it is not against
the public policy of the forum to recognize a title 'won' by robbing an innocent citizen
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We have now reached the topic of public policy. As my Lord
Burrough said, "it is a very unruly horse, and once you get astride
it you never know where it will carry you.1 2 7 Let us see briefly
where it has carried the Fifth Circuit.
On October 17, 1962, the Fifth Circuit decided three cases involving Cuban expropriations. The leading case, Rodriguez v.Pan
An erican Life Ins. Co.,28 is an action under life insurance policies
issued to Cubans in Cuba by a Louisiana company with a branch
office in Havana. The branch office had been nationalized and
the Cuban state substituted as the obligor of all policies outstanding
in Cuba, but the company did not stress this defense here. Instead,
it argued that the policyholders were "proscribed nationals." They
had occupied positions of importance under the Batista regime, and
early in 1959, their properties had been declared forfeit to the Cuban
State.
As already mentioned, the Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the
Second Circuit in holding that by virtue of what is here termed the
consistent, repeated, and current position of the State Department,
the Act of State doctrine does not apply to Cuban expropriations.2
But obviously, the proscription decrees here set up in defense were
not in violation of international law, as they were aimed only at
Cuban nationals. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals directed the
District Court to determine "whether the Cuban decrees are confiscatory or whether the particular decrees are otherwise violative of fundamental concepts of justice, and, therefore, without status, in these
particular cases." 30 In other words, the court held the confiscation
of an alien's property by the state of his own nationality within the
territory of such state to be violative of the forum's public policy.81
The second case decided on October 17, Mendendez v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., concerns a "proscribed national" whose property in Cuba
of the forum in order to 'punish' him for what his State i.e., the very State of the forum,
has 'done'-what is the public policy clause good for?"
-7Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 1824). For
an illuminating discussion of the subject, see Kahn-Freund, Reflections on Public
Policy in the English Conflict of Laws, 39 THE GROnuS SOCIET', TRANSACTIONS 59

(1954).
28 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
29
id. at 437.
80
Id. at 436.
But see note 35 infra.
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was insured with defendant. 2 The loss occurred before the proscription, but the appraisal was made after plaintiff had sought
refuge in the United States. Acting under the proscription decree,
the Cuban government called upon the company to pay the assessed
damages to it; such payment was in fact effected through the sale of
part of the company's assets kept on deposit in Cuba as security for
policies written there. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit summarily
reversed the lower court's dismaissal of the action "for reasons stated
in Rodriguez.
The third case, Tabacalerav. Standard Cigar Co., arose out of
the "intervention" of the Cuban cigar industry.3 3 Tobacco had been
shipped by Tabacalera before the intervention, but the purchase
price became due thereafter. Plaintiff, a Cuban refugee who was the
sole owner of Tabacalera, sued to recover the purchase price. The
District Court dismissed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, again
referring to Rodriguez.
There are some parallel cases in the Florida state courts,8 4 and
there also is a subsequent decision of the Fifth Circuit,3 5 but I will
33 Menendez v. Aetna Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962). The facts are not stated
in the opinion, but have been reconstructed from the record and counsel's briefs, which
were made available to us.
82 Tabacalera Severiouno Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 311 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1962). Again, the facts are reconstructed from the record and from counsel's briefs.
$,Jorge v. Antonio Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 101 (Circuit Court, Hillsborough County,
1961) (same plaintiff as in Tabacalera, supra note 33, but another defendant);
Lorido v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 167 (District Court, Dade County
1962); Raij v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 162 (District Court, Dade
County 1962).
Il Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Inocencio Blanco, 311 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1962).
Appellee, a Cuban national who had purchased three annuity policies from appellant
in Cuba, brought suit on these policies in the United States. Appellant company
pleaded, inter alia, that Cuba had expropriated not only its properties in Cuba, but
also specifically substituted, by Cuban legislation, the Republic of Cuba as the
obligor, under all policies outstanding in Cuba. With respect to this latter defense,
the Fifth Circuit stated:
This Court . . . applied the legal principles enunciated in Judge Waterman's
opinion in Sabbatino to actions by Cuban nationals now residing in the United
States for the cash surrender value of policies issued by Pan American; held
that "Our courts are not compelled by the Act of State Doctrine to give force
and effect to the decrees of the Castro government in Cuba"; and reversed orders
dismissing the complaints and remanded the cases to the District Court for determining, upon development of all the facts, whether the Cuban decrees involved
were confiscatory and violative of the principles of international law "and therefore without status in these particular cases." Id. at 428.
It would seem that the court is here interpreting Rodriguez (supra note 4, discussed
supra text at notes 28-31), as being decided on grounds of international law, not public
policy. This would seem to pose a curious paradox. For only the American com-
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not trouble you with these. It seems that the public policy issue
is raised in its classical form in the three cases decided on October 17.
The Act of State doctrine does not apply, but neither does international law. Once you accept the proposition-quite doubtful to me
in the life insurance cases-that the "proper" law is Cuban, Cuban
law will govern unless its applicability is excluded by the public
policy of the forum. If the public policy of the forum indeed condemns all foreign confiscations irrespective of the nationality of the
victims, as the Fifth Circuit has expressly indicated, our problem is
solved. Either the Act of State doctrine applies and the confiscation
is recognized, or the Act of State doctrine does not apply and the
consfication is not recognized. The rule is, of course, broad enough
to cover the Sabbatino case, without the necessity of recourse to
international law.

IV
FEDERAL AND STATE LAw

This brings me to the last point which I propose to discuss. How
do you square these holdings on the Act of State doctrine and on
public policy with Erie3 6 and Klaxon?37 Both Sabbatino and Rodriguez have held that the Act of State doctrine is not a rule of international law.28 Of course it is not, for otherwise we would have an
international full faith and credit clause for governmental actions,
which obviously does not exist. Besides, where the act in question
involves a violation of international law, one has some difficulty in
visualizing the acting state as earnestly claiming that the victim
must accept and give effect to the illegal act.
But if the Act of State doctrine is not a rule of public interna-

tional law, what is it? Sabbatino and Rodriguez tell us that it is a
rule of the conflict of laws. 9 If so, then under Erie-Klaxon, it is
applicable in a federal court only where the state in which the court
pany, not the Cuban plaintiff, is entitled to the protection of international law.
But instead of invoking such protection (if, indeed, individuals can do so, see supra
at note 18 and sources there referred to), the "aggrieved" party is relying on the
international delinquency.
T
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The problem discussed
in the text is briefly adverted to in Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d
845, 869 n. 16. See also Note, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and
Public International Law, 62 CoLuM. L. Rmv. 1278, 1296-97 (1962).
88 307 F.2d at 855; 311 F.2d at 434.
119Ibid.

Vol.1963:281]

NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 301

sits has incorporated the rule into its law. This is the case in New
York and in Florida-with the Bernstein 11 limitation at least in the
latter state-and, to judge by a hurried look into "Sheperds," also in
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Texas, and Oregon.
Suppose a state has no decision in point. Then a federal court
sitting there would presumably be free to assume that the state court
would in all probability follow the lead of the other states and recognize the Act of State doctrine.
But suppose a state court expressly rejects the Act of State doctrine. Here, in my opinion, Klaxon fails. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
there will be no certiorarifrom the decision of the state court of
last resort, because there is no violation of the Constitution, a federal
statute, or a treaty. On the other hand, I, for one, would maintain
that a federal court sitting in a state which has rejected the Act of
State doctrine still has to give effect to it. For the doctrine is, in
my opinion, not only a rule of the conflict of laws, but also a rule of
judicial abstention, laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States for the entire federal judiciary.
Consequently, as a practical matter we may conclude that the
Act of State doctrine will be in danger only where there is either no
diversity or where the object in controversy is less than $10,000. In
all other cases arising in "doubtful" states, one of the parties will
remove.
Now as to public policy: national or state? Judicially determined or declared by the executive? It seems clear that in line with
Belmont, Pink, and Kolovrat,40 a federal court will give effect to an
express executive determination of public policy. Specific authority
in point would seem to be Bernstein 11.41 Where there is no
40 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961).
41In Bernstein 1I, the State Department had declared that: [T]his government has
consistently opposed the forcible acts of dispossession of a discriminatory nature
practiced by the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to their controls," and
that: "[T]he policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United
States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu thereof) lost
through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to
relieve American courts from any constraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." The court, faced with this
declaration, permitted the plaintiff to allege matters otherwise barred by the Act of
State doctrine. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954). Thereupon, the case was settled, so that,
strictly speaking, there never was a decision as to the legal effect, if any, of the first
part of the declaration here quoted.
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countervailing federal public policy, a federal court would also
probably give effect to a clearly expressed state public policy.
But where do you find such a policy, and how do you shape a
federal rule of public policy where there is no express state public
policy and no executive declaration?42 The issue is complicated
even where, as in New York, you have state court decisions on public
policy in the field of expropriations. For all of these decisions, so
far as I can determine, proceed from the assumption that the Act of
State doctrine is applicable. Take, for instance, the case of Kleve
v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft In Basel.48 The facts
are about on all fours with some of the Cuban insurance cases,
especially with Menendez, where the insurance company had actually paid the confiscating government. In the Kleve case, Mr. Justice
Peck held:
As for the very obnoxious and offensive character of the German
decrees, the court is obliged to hold that governing law is no less controlling because it is bad law. The plaintiffs shift the point when they
argue that our courts will not enforce foreign law contrary to our own
public policy. This is not a case of enforcing German law here but
rather of necessarily recognizing the force of German law in Germany.
Certainly, our courts would not enforce the German law by applying
it to the assets of these plaintiffs in this country, but we cannot undo or
by the German government with the
set at naught what has been done
44
assets of the parties in Germany. '
42See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 859 (2d Cir. 1962): "The
right to just compensation in return for property taken by the government is certainly
well established in American jurisprudence. It is even protected by the Constitution,
Amend. V. Therefore, it is likely that any taking of one's property without provision
for adequate compensation is contrary to the public policy of this forum.... But we
are aware of the admonition that public policy is an 'unruly horse.' The concept
has proved to be a very difficult one to confine when one seeks to apply it. We are
not entirely certain what the American public would consider to be the proper policy
of the United States with respect to expropriation of the property of aliens by foreign
sovereigns when the property has its situs within the foreign countries. Also, decision
of this case based upon the public policy of this forum is undesirable because reliance
upon such a basis for decision results in a nationalistic, or municipal, solution of a
problem that is clearly international." But see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 332 (1937): "The public policy of the United States relied upon as a bar to the
action is that declared by the Constitution, namely, that private property shall not be
taken without just compensation. But the answer is that our Constitution, laws and
policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens ....
What another country has done in the way of taking over property of its nationals, and
especially of its corporations, is not a matter of judicial consideration here. Such
nationals must look to their own government for any redress to which they may be
entitled."
"3182 Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S.2d 882 (S. Ct., N.Y. County 1943).
" Id. at 782; 45 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
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But he went on to quote authorities couched in Act of State terms.
Would he have shaped a different rule if he had felt to be free from
the restraints of the Act of State doctrine? I do not know, and
neither do I know what the Fifth Circuit would have done in the
Menendez case if Kleu had been a Florida, not a New York decision.
I will conclude with this confession of ignorance. I hope to
have presented you with some of the questions, and am now eager
to listen to answers.

